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--?ere is now a considerable body of literature on the issues and 
problems relating to the use and overuse of common property 
reseurces -- sometimes referred to as "con;mons" ( See for example 
gerker, 1985; Christy, 1966 ; 'Jiriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, 1975; 
Gerden, 1954; Hardin, 1968 ; Z?.unge, 1986 ; Schlager & ~strom, 1987 
4 ceuens i s  an economic resource or f a c i l i t y  subject to 
individual use but not to individual possession. Hence all 
cemans face one problem: how best c m  one coordinate ind5.vidual 
uses te attain an optimal rate of production or consumption for 
che whale community. (Oakerson, 1988) . A very popular and 
Sorcefully argued aiswer to the problem is to grant property or 
m e s s  rights to  the users. { See Christy, 1982 f o r  the  case i n  
In developing countries, use of common property resources is 
C ~ a ~ e l y  related to the survival and sustenance of a vast 
~epulatien ~ f ' ~ e r s o n s  such as pastoralists, forest dwellers and 
f :sherf elk. As a r e s u l t ,  issues pertaining to the use and 
Overuse ef these resources are not merely questions that can be 
terelved solely by resorting to granting of access or property 
t ~ g h t s  te the array of claimants to :he resource.  They raise 
&@re fundamental socio-economic and political issues which can 
rnly be understood and addressed in the larger context of the 
histerf and dynamics of change that  have taken place in relation 
t o  thc'acceas to, and use of ?he resou1:ce. Equally important are 
t h ~  very snec i a l  nature-related nspect:, of t h ~  .a resources that  
mu.st be taken particular cognisance of when analysins 
~f overuse. 
Ifo~2ver, if access to a coFmons ::esults at some point j.:; time t o .  
unrestricted entry, it generally rdsults  in social and political 
tensions. These tensions more oftcn than not arise only after a 
certain threshold limit is croszed and is rarely due to on' 
single cause. Generally it is a variety of complex causes whicm 
include among others: changes ir_ technology, increased market 
demand for the produce of t3s commons, population pressurec 
nature-related changes and political forces, These csuses 
mutually interact and thus tend -Lo exacerbate the tensions- 
o f t e n  these causes have been confused, and very i n f l u e n t i 4  
opinions ascribe the 1-roblem to vel:y institution of commefl 
propest:r .' : -c .  r : 7 s  p-- + ?  CI.qn -:- .-: . _ +.- - -  k c  pcpulation pressureq - 
f t  is a l s o  argued t h a t  the rufn of a ccmmons brings ruin to 
those who use it. The most popular expressio3 of the above points 
are found in Hardin's (1968) fa~rior.~s article entitled ' ~ r z g e d y  e4 
the Commons'. [I] 
This Paper will examine the case of one such common propert 
resource -- the coastal sea eco-~~~:ten a d the fish therein- 1 
seeks to highlight how a combination of economic, technologica 
and social factors interacting in a specific context results i 
overuse of the commons leading to its near ruin, It points t 
the fact that the ensuing detrincntal economic canseq~iences arq 
by ne means equitably distributed. 
In geographic coverage the paper is restricted to Kerala State. 
Being the leading maritime state in India it provides an 
interesting case study of whet has been referred to as the 'life 
cycle' model (Berkes, 1985)  . This model, when applied to the 
fishery, is essentially the study of the whole diachronic process 
of initial harmonious and sustainable harvesting of the coastal 
fishery resources followed by rapid and excessive harvesting 
verging on a very serious economic and ecological crisis. For 
the athor maritime states in India that have not yet reached the 
latter condition, it provides an example of a model, the final 
!ItaWs of which, they may try to avoid by making appropriate 
wlicy interventions at the appropriate time. 
The paper is divided into eight parts. It begins by providing a 
eackdrop which very briefly sketches the relevant aspects of the 
.istory of the fishery development process in Kerala State. Tn 
the rubsequent parts the attempt will be to: enumerate the 
rrrieur factors leading to the overuse, which in fishery parlance 
8 called overf iehing; provide evidence of overf ishing; assess 
.he impact of overfishing on the various social groups depending 
e 7  the resource; analyse their responses to the effects of 
e:erfishing and finally .examine possible ways of resolving the 
: risim . 
1. BACKDROP 
Fishing, as a subsistance occupation of a caste-bound communit~, 
has a long and hoary tradition in India. Traditional marine 
fishing communities have over the centuries of learning-through- 
labour evolved a keen understanding of the aquatic eco-system and 
perfected fish harvesting artifacts which were appropriate t@ 
that milieu. Their technology was appropriate for fishing merely  
as a source of meagre livelihood. Such a situation obtained in 
India until the dawn of independence in 1947. 
Fisheries gained importance with the onset of post-independence 
economic planning in India. The long coastline and the 
productive continental shelf gave fisheries the status of a 
Sector capable of accelerating t1:o growth of the rural economy *f 
the country. Accordingly, planned marine fisheries development 
had the multi-faceted. objectives of increasing the fish harvest, 
,improving socio-economic conditions of fishermen, augmenting 
export earnings and generating new employment opportunit~e~~ 
These objectives were to be achieved through initiatives promoted 
by the state and private efforts. 
TO achieve them the "modernisation growth-oriented" model af 
development, Largely premised on the experience of the mere 
developed temperate water maritime countries, was accepted- This 
approach primarily implied the superimposition of a modern, 
capital-intensive, specialised technology over the existing 
traditional base which was large-y labour-inten-lve and of great 
technical diversity. It assumed that this base was a hinderance 
t@ development and had to be either transformed or completely 
phased out. 
In Ktrala State, the leading maritime state of India, the 
rppreach to fisheries development was initially radically 
different. The states's fishery policy in the first decade of 
planned development -- 1956 to 1966 -- can be summarised as 
having been based on "the judicious exploitation of marine 
reseurces by effectively and gradually raising the productive 
capabilities of the existing facilities giving primacy to the 
accumulated skills of the fishermen. " (Ktlrien, 1985) 
During this phase'incrzased fishing effort was applied by the 
,-,,,, ,A 22: ti3nal non-mechanised craft artisanal 5i;harrnen using .." - '--- 
and a wide array of f ishfng gear and tackle. There was a rapid 
change from cotton to nylon nets. The overall fish harvest, and 
that ef species like prawns, also increased substantially. 
This approach did not last long. By the mid-1960's the 
"medernisation growth-oriented" model soon came. to be introduced 
in Kerala. The single most important factor responsible for 
this was the rising demand for prawn in the international market. 
The waters off Kerala, being one of the world's richest resource 
far the penaeid prawns, virtually became the main "breeding 
qreund" for this model . 
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Fisheries development in Kerala , iate soon becar..,- synonymous with 
increasing prawn harvest and earning foreign exchange. With the 
phenomenal rise in the number of small trawlers -- introduced 
initially by the former Indo-Norwegian Project -- the prawn 
harvest and export earnings increased steadily. The earlier 
caste-bound nature of the fishery sector ceased to be a barrier 
to entry. The main investors involved in the new development 
model were non-fishermen. (For details of this see Kurien, 1985) 
For a decade -- until mid-1970's -- it was smooth sailing. The 
direction of the tide changed after 1974. The levels of overall 
fish and prawn harvest began to fall. By the end of the seventies 
the marine fishery sector of the state heading towards an 
ecological crisis of overfishing. 
The artisanal fishermen who were only peripheral beneficiaries of 
this moder~isation model respcnded to this crisis at two levels. 
The more rapid, widespread and vocal response was in the form of 
organised protest demanding state regulation of what they 
perceived as destructive fishing methods. ( For details see 
Kurien & Achari, 1988) The slower response was in the form of 
adoption of new technologies for propulsion of their fishing 
crafts and greater investments in fishing gear i:n a desperate 
attempt to enhance their share of falling harvests. This 
response only further aggravated the level of overfishing 
particularly after 1984. 
averfishing not only implied a f . ~ l  in the fisi: harvest but led 
to a very skewed distribution of the benefits and costs in the 
fish economy. This in turn came to attain larger socio-political 
implications which today plague the state. 
2.  THE MEANING OF OVERFISHING 
averfishing of the near shore marine waters -- the coastal 
commons-- is l a  problem besetting many developing countries 
today. It is however rather complicated to decide with precision 
the stage at which the coastal commons gets overfished. ( For a 
thearetical understanding of the issues involved see: Beverton 6r 
Holt ,1957; Caddy,1984; Gordon,l954; Hannesson,l978; 
?anryotou,1982; Pauly, 1979; Schaef er, 1954 ) The evidence 
available points to the fact that overfishing has come as a 
result of many interrelated * a c * . o ~ s  of which the "common 
?r@)ertyN nature of these marine waters is but one. 
It is customary to distinguish between two types of overfishing: 
economic and biological. 
tcononic overfishing occurs when marginal costs of an additional 
unit of fishing effort are higher than marginal revenues. The 
econeay experiences loss ( even though total fish catch may still 
increase) because of a 'mis-allocation of capital and labour which 
night have produced higher economic yields in alternative 
activities. 
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Biological 01 r-fishing occurs . .en the marg! a1 yield of an 
additional unit of fishing effort is negative.[2] At such a 
level of effor5 the fish population stock is prevented from 
generating its maximum sustainable yield.131 
Overfishing, or the application of excessive fishing effort, thus 
in a sense, heralds a turning point in the dynamics ef 
exploitation of a fishery resource. It is the threshold of 
"development" and the last call for "managementw (Aguero, 1987). 
It is a juncture, which if left unattended could spell ruin to 
much of the fishery resource and to .a significant section af 
those whose lives are dependent on it. 
In the context of developing countries it would therefore be 
appropriate to seek nolicies to . avoid problems of excessive 
effort. Thf-r can be ach5.e-red cbrsuqh m a n ~ e n e n t  measures that 
seek to maintain a development process of the fishery which will 
keep the resource at a high level of productivity by matching 
fishing effort to the biological and ecological condition of the 
fish stock. 
To achieve such a desirable situation presupposes not merely an 
attack on the effects of overfishing the coastal commons but 
rather a clear understanding of the factors which, caused it in 
the first place, 
3. THE FISHERY RESOJRCES OF KERALA 
' The sea off the South-West coast of India, comprising the 
maritime states of Goa; Karnataka and Kerala, forms a relatively 
heno~eneous *aquatic eco-zone . The inshore or coastal waters 
(upto a depth of 50 metres) of this region measures 23,400 square 
kilometrem and has a maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 141. of 
700,@00 tonnes (George et al, 1977) . The average fishery 
productivity potential of these waters works out to 30 tonnes per 
aware kilometre (or 300 kg fo; every hectare) making it the most 
productive fishing zone in India. ( The all-India figure is 12.5 
tenner per sq. km) . Kerala State accounts for just 12,570 sq.kms 
of thin coastal sea area which has an estimated MSY of 400,000 
tenner. 
The fishery resources in the tropical seas off Kerala State are 
marked by the multitude of species attaining varying sizes at age 
a t  maturity. They are widely dispersed in the coastal commons. 
aoch specie is available in relatively small quantities, There 
ate complex prey-pr.edator relationships between them as well as 
campe t i tion for food . 
Tke above are  distinctly different from the characteristics of 
f irh remourcer temperate waters. In temperate waters one finds a 
relatively rmaller number of species which grow to larger sizes 
and each rpacie is available in teeming millions. The inter- 
apecie interactions are also less complex than what obtains in 
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the tropical waters making it easier to "target" fishing 
operations to specific species. 
Fish species are generally divided into two broad categories i n  
accordance to the niche that they generally inhabit in the marine 
environment. Pelagic species are the predominantly surface 
dwelling fishes. The demersal species are those that 
inhabit the bottom of the sea. The behaviour and life cycles ef 
pelagic species are more prone to influences of oceanogra~hi 
conditions like changes in water temperature, salinity, dissolve 3 
oxygen content and so forth.Demersa1 species remain largelr 
unaffected by such changes. 
For the purpose of data collection the numerous fish species *f 
Kerala have been clubbed under about 54 broad names. The fisM 
harvest pattern of 1984-85 indicate the important species to brl 
oil sardines, mackerals, anchovies, ribbon fish, carangids ( a l l  
I 
pelagic) penaeid prawns, soles, sciaenids, perches and catfisl 
(all demersal) . Of these, oil sardines, mackerals and penaei4 
Prawns have traditional.1~ been considered the three prim 
economic species. Their MSY's are estimated to be 1 2 6 1 ~ ~  
tonnes, 56,000 tonnes and 56,000 tonnes respectively. 
4. FACTORS CONTRIBV-iNG TO OVERFISLiNG 
There are several factors contributing to excessive fishing 
effort in a fishery. We will restrict our assessment to five 
major areas: (a) the open access nature of the fishery (b) the 
of inappropriate technology (c) the demand-pull factors that 
create galloping prices (d l  financial subsidies offered by the 
qtate which' encourage investment and (el the pressure of 
pepulation on the coastal commons. 
hen Access Nature 
When traditional technologies and the custom-bound organisation 
of the fish economy predominated, the common property nature of 
tha marine fish resource did not pose a major problem. Technical 
mrriers, such as the ceed to have fishery specific skills, and 
¶@cia1 b~rriers, li!rc f i s h i i ~ g  being the occupation of a lower 
caste, prevented free entry of capital and persons from outside 
Ae traditional fishing communities into the fishery. 
';he introduction of mechanised boats and the perceived prof it 
@#portunities from involving in activities like prawn exporting 
changed this scenario considerably. The vibrant merchant class 
rf Korala took the first initiatives to break these barriers. 
They shifted some of their capital from land based activities-- 
auch am coir and cashewnut exports -- to fishing, processing and 
exporting of prawns. Rapid entry was facilitated by the free 
cccesa to the sea: mechanised boats could be operated without any 
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form of licence or registxatian- There was also no regulatien 
limiting the ownership of fishing assets only to those-who were 
active fishermen. As a matte'r of fact, entry into the fishery 
was given greater impetus by the liberal financial assistance ef 
the state(more details about this below). As a result, the gost- 
1966 period witnessed a considerable influx of non-fishernen 
owners of fishing assets -- particularly mechanised trawlers. 
Between 1966 'and 1985 the number of trawlers increased from a 
couple of hundred to around 2800. 
Use of Inappropriate Technoloav 
Traditional fishing technologies ( nets, tackle and the methods 
I 
of fishing) were in general evolved to suit the particular 
ecological context of the seas and the varying behaviour patterns 
of the fish. Deserving special mention is the ' selective nature 
of fishir.;; nets (a saecisl iiies;.-size/shape for catching a 
specific specie of fish) and the "passive" nature of fishing 
operations (allowing fish $0 get entangled in the net rather thar 
going in hotrpurs-uit of them orscatching them by disturbing their 
milieu). 
As indicated earlier, the "modernisation" phase of fisheries 
development was premised on the need to introduce fishing crafts,  
gear and methods which were proven efficient in the temperate 
water milieu. These tended to be "active" fishing techniques 
using single gear combinations innovated for the fishery 
resources of the temperate waters. Trawling ( the method @f 
13 
scraping the sea bottom wtth a ,ell-shaped net co catch demersal 
fish) and purse-seining I the method of quickly encircling whole 
sheals of pelagic fish) were two such techniques introduced after 
the decade of the sixties. 
Both these techniques were very capltal-intensive and initially 
raised labour productivities . For the short-run unit harvesting 
cests were low and given the high prices of certain species of 
f i s h  (see below),, the profits to owners was very high. This led 
- ,  
t e  r rapid increase i n  numbers and the extensive use of these 
techniques. This contributed very significantly to overf ishing by 
destreying the sea-bottom eco-niche (trawling) and by 
indiscriminate and non-selec tive fishing of whole shoals of 
pelegic fishes (purse-seining) . 
BeomPxq b :,--?p 
The introduction of trawlers into' Kerala coincided with the rise 
in ' demand for  prawns in the  international market. This was 
spurred of by factors, such as the enhanced domestic growth of the  
U.S and Japanese economies and also the former's loss of access 
te  supply from China. These demand-pull factors were outside the 
contrel of the  local economy and i was also difficult to 
insulate  the fishery resources from being harvested in response 
to them. 
From a commodity used to manur- coconut palms, prawns grew t* 
become the 'pink gold' of marine exports from India. In 1961-62 
the beach price of prawns was only Rs.240 per tonne -- less than 
. 
even the price of mackerels which were considered the "poor man's 
protein". In 1971-72 prawn prices reached Rs.1810 per tonne. 
Between then and 1984-85 it increased nearly seven-fold while the 
prices of oil sardines and mackerals rose by 184 and 213 percent 
respectively. (Table 1 ) 
Table: 1 Trends in Prawn and Fish Prices in Kerala 
(current prices; Index: 1971-72=100) 
Year Prawns Oil Sardine Mackeral 
Rs/Tonne Index Rs/Tonne Index Rs/Tonne Index 
Source: Dept. of Fisheries, Kerala State: Adminstration Reports 
(several years) 
In the case of the domestically consumed fish species -- oil 
sardines and mackerals -- there is evidence to show that thp 
increased prices were the result of the inability to enhance the 
harvests in keeping with the growing demand for fish from the 
local population (Kurien,1978). Purse-seiners yere first. 
introduced in Kerala in 1976. Until then oil sardines and 
mackerals were caught exclusively by fishermen using traditional 
crafts and gear. 
State Subsidies 
?ollawing the adoption of the "modernisation path" to fisheries 
~evelopment, the state became actively involved in promoting the 
direction of investments in the sector. 
Ta give impetus to this policy the state instituted many 
attractive subsidies for the mechanisation programme. It 
invested in the capital-intensive and long gestation 
infrastructure facilities like harbours, landing centres etc. It 
alsa provided training facilities. 
The initial spate of subsidies was very liberal. As much as 25 
percent of the cost of the hull of the boat and 50 percent of the 
cost ef its engine were prcvi4ed as grants. The remainder was 
treated as a loan to be repaid in 64 instalments over a period of 
8 years at 7 percent interest. 
In theory all the 1200 mechanised boats so issued by the state 
between 1961-62 and 1977-78 were to fishermen cooperatives or 
fenuine groups of fishermen. In practice however this hardly did 
happen as is evident from the evaluation of these cooperatives by 
r gevernment report which concludes: "The failure in the 
aperation of the scheme of distribution of mechanised boats were 
due ta the fact that the fishermen cooperatives to whom or 
threuyh whom the boats were issued were all benami (under false 
name) cooperatives alnost b i t i i o u c  any exception. The rich and 
influential among the fishermen sponsored and controlled the 
cooperatives."(Krishna Kumar, 1981) 
It was this realisation which prompted the dropping of a similar 
scheme drawn up for the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980/81 to 8 4 / 8 5 )  
which envisaged providing subsidies and soft loans for th 
introduction of purse-seiners. Although tge state dropped th 
scheme, the private entrepreneurs went ahead with finance 
provided by commercial financing institutions. 
State subsidies for mechanised boats were completely withdrawn i 
1973. From 1985 onwards, foll-owing the rush of artisanal 
fishermen to obtain outboard engines, the state extend q 
subsidies at the rate of Rs.3000 per engine and ~s.2600 per craf  
and gear. Though late, for the first time, state subsidies wer( 
enjoyed by genuine fishermen ! The rapid increase in outboa4 
engines in Kerala State from a handful in 1982 to as many as 8 0 ' '  
in 1988, is to a small extent due to these incentives. 
Population Pressure on In-shore Waters 
One characteristic of tropical water fisheries is that overuse 
even low productive, passive fishing gear can affect 
renewability of stocks (Pauly, 1979). The pressure exerted 
increasing numbers of fishermen using increasing amounts 
has thi c t=f f o p t  
3 fishing equipment,within the limited area of the coastal w a t e  
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Tke active fishermen p ~ p ~ ! l ? t j . ~ n  has been increasing at a rate of 
a b u t  2.3 per cent per annum. Xn 1961 there were 80,700 active 
fishermen in Kerala. Given Kerala's coastal sea area of 12570 Sq. 
hs., the population density was about 6.4 fishermen per sq-km 
enruring that on the average each fisherman had 16 hectares of 
crrstrl commons to  fish. By 1985 the population increased by 65 
vrcent to -134,000, increasing the fishermen population density 
i n  the coastal sea area to 10.6 per sq.km. Th.is reduced the 
average coastal commons per fisherman to 9 hectares. 
With the increase in the number of fishermen their fishing assets 
alre increased. Traditional fishing crafts increased from around 
8 in 1961 to over 27000 in 1986. More important are the 
incrt888~ in the quality and the quantity of fishing gear. During 
the las t  two decades practicallv all the fishermen have shifted 
aver frola using cotton to nylon nets. Though no aggregate 
estinrtos are - available, evidence f ram vf llage studies .indicate 
that the  quantum of fishing nets and other tackle have increased 
significantly. (Achari, 1987a) 
Thir fact  became most evident with the post-1982 outboard 
meterisation drive which was induced by declining productivity 
due t m  mverfishing of the coastal commons. (More details about 
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This population-induced increase of f ishiag pressure can 
certainly be viewed.as an issue which will now exacerbate the 
extent of overf ishing if present trends continue. 
From a reading of the five above mentioned factors which 
contribute to overfishing it should be evident that they are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. This makes the issue ef 
economic and biological overfishing a very complicated matter t o  
deal with. 
5 .  THE EVIDENCE OF OVERFISHING 
Considerable data is now available to indicate that the above 
mentioned factors ha-~e in combination led to the ecological 
crisis in the coastal waters of Kerala. The evidence with 
respect to some parameters is substantial but patchy in t h e  case 
of others. The total picture that emerges however points 
undoubtedly to a scenario of strong tendencies towards overall 
economic and eco-system overfishing with biological overfishing 
clearly established in regard to the most valuable specie-- 
prawn. 
Bioloaical and Eco-system Overfishinq 
Kerala State has been the leading maritime state contributinq 
between 20 - 35 per cent of the total marine fish harvest in 
India between 1956 and 1985.153 The total marine fis'h harvest in 
Kerala during this period f luctuatsed between 152,200 tonnes 
(1956) and 448,300 tonnes (1973). Within this the harvest of 
pelagic species  ranged between 89,900 tonnes (1956) and 357,000 
tannes (1971) and that of the demersal species between 48,000 
tanner (1957) and 198,000 tonnes (1975). 
@re can discern two distinct phases in this time span of three 
decades: a phase of steadily increasing harvests -- 1956 to 1973 
and a phase of stagnating or declining harvests -- 1973-1985. 
This broad periodisation is valid whether one considers the total 
harvest, the harvest of pelagic and demersal groupings or the 
rnajer economic spedies -- oil sardines & mackerals and prawns. 
This is evident from the growth rates shown'in Table 2 for the 
twa periods mentioned above. 
Table: 2 Compound Growth Rates of Fish Harvest of Kerala State# 
Species Groups Period I Period I1 
3956-1973 1973-1985 
Tattl Marine Fish Harvest 3.23* -1.79* 
T~tal Pelagic Fish Harvest 3.19* -0.18 
Tmtal Demersal Fish Harvest 3.52* -4.60* 
Tata l  Oil Sardine & Mackeral Harvest 5,01* 0.60 
Tetal Prawn Harvest 6-21" -8.30" 
Y Sstilnated using semi-log function 
* Significant at 5 % 
Te establish that a decline in fish harvests points to biological 
rverf ishing conventionally requires that at least two more 
indicators exhibit a downward trend. These are (i) the catch per 
unit (fishing) effort (CPUE) and (ii) the size of the harvested 
fish species. 
In a multi-s ecie fishery these '~dicators can ~ n l y  be measured 
with respect to a particular specie. In our case we have such 
data only w i . t h  regard to penaeid prawns -- the most important 
economic specie and the most controversial one in regard to the 
overfishing debate, 
In the main prawn landing centre in Kerala (Neendakara) the catch 
Per unit effort (CPUE) declined from 83 kg/hr of fishing effort 
in 1973 to 20 kg/hr in 1984 (George, 1988) .Taking the three moat 
important centres where trawler operations are concentrated 
(~eendakara, ~ochin and Calicut) the CPUE for 1973 and 1984 are 
50kg/hr and 20 kg/hr respectively. 
As regards the declining size of prawns it is sufficient to quota  
one of the leading fishery scientists of the country who had 
specialised on the prawn fisher:. On analysin, the lrariation ii 
the size of prawns in the main landing centres he cautions: 
"Regarding the range in sizes of the different species at 
these centres, one important point which emerges from a 
comparison of the data of 1978 and 1983 is that in the 
case of both dominant species, namely P, stylifera and 
M.Dobsoni, much smaller sizes are coming in the catches 
of 1983 when compared to that of 1978. Along with the 
range in sizes there is also a drop in the sizes of the 
major groups represented in the fishery. This should be 
feature strengthening the suspicion about the depletionary 
tendencies noticed in the shrimp fisheries of Kerala and 
n another point of concern from the conservation approach* 
(George, 1988) 
Another overall indicator, pointing at least to the p~ssibilit 
of eco-system overfishing, is the decline in the catches of t 
demersal species of fish. As inrlicated earlier. these bott 
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Pvalling spe,ks ere largely En: ' Zected by natu.-., induced changes 
in their eco-system. Hence, both the increase and the decline in 
their ha:ves%-,s can be atttibutcd to  man-induced i.nterven-tions--d 
the fern of fishing. Betwoen the years' 1971-75 and 1981-85 the 
harvests of nearly' all the important . .demersal species .registered 
a shsrp decline. (See Table 3 ) This can largely be attributed 
t a  excessive or destructive fishing -- particularly the use of 
trawlers. 
Table: 3 Demersa; F i s h  Harvest in Kerala 
Species 1971/75 1976/80 1981/85 Percent change over 
1971/75 
1976/80 1981/85 
Catfish 22 ' 11 1 0  ( 5 0 )  (55)  
Perches 10 16 7 60 (30) 
Scitenids 10 9 5 (10) ( 5 0 )  
Leiogna thus 21 4 5 (64)  ( 5 5 )  
Prawns 59 41 29 (31) ' (  51 
ethers 36 30 38 (17) 6 
Total I48 111 94 (25 (36 
0 ?i&wes in ( ) indicate percentage decline . 
Source: * Babu Paul, 1982 C Govt of Rerala 1985 
Gconmmic Overf ishing 
R a t  economic . overf ishing had set in by the .advent of the 1980's 
can be gleamed from the evidence of profitability calculations 
male far the trawler fleet at different points in time. 
In 1968-69 trawlers in . R ~ r a l s  (above lorn length) operated on an 
-.. . C.". 231. 7 60 days and landed 30 tonnes of fish valued at 
Rs.34,500 il.curring a total .~erating cost R.s.26,700. Net 
income after depreciation and interest worked out t.0 Rs.7,800 or 
a 14 percent return on the investrent. (Govt. of India, 1971). In 
1978 an enquiry conducted by the Kerala State Planning Board 
indicated a net 'return on investment from traw1in.g boats of 8.6 
percent (Govt of Kerala, 1979). Results from( an FAO/UND? 
sponsored study indicated that in 1980-81 trawlers operated on 
the average for 157 days and landed 19 tonnes of fish valued at 
Rs.92,300 but incurring a larger total cost. This resulted in a 
negative rate of return (Kurien & Willmann, 1982). . 
A Task Force of the Government of India observed: "Due to the 
introduction of powerful engines and longer hours of operation, 
the consumption of diesel has increased considerably. In 1971, 
the average daily consumption of diesel by a boat was only 75 
litres. It rose to 100 litres 11. 1976 and to 150 litres in 19S1; 
Also the catch per unit effort has come down very much in the 
last five years, as more number of boats were operating in the 
same fishing grounds. The daily average catch around Augus't 1921 
was about Rs.825 as against the total cost of operation of 
Rs.1283 per boat." (Govt of India, 1982) 
All .the above figures are averages. The profitability range was 
likely to 'have been large. Despite "average losses" it i r  
reckoned that as much as a third of the fleet was operating 
profitably. This fact, coupled with the fluctuating nature of 
fortunes from fish harvests, provides a strong incentive fer 
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xr#inrl Imsa makers to continue in the fisherb. They pin their 
t.a)mr on a bumper catch in the near future which could wipe out 
their acpurrulated losses. 
There is another important reason for the continued expansion of 
the fleet despite the overall profitability decline indicated by 
:be cmmt-earnings calculations. Having initially obtained 
tubridism and long term loans from the state, the owners of 
revrral b a t .  have defaulted in their repayments. In fact, since 
mt ef them have appropriate political connections the 
repayment of loans seems more closely correlated to one's 
Cmtactn rather than the economics of operation of one's boats. 
9his makes the private return from the boats to the owners still 
iuer8tive when .calculated on the basis of their own investments 
&rr it ! In March 1986 a provisional estimate of the Government 
#f Xerrla, aeresaed the  tot*^ accumulated arrears on loan 
mamontm due f ram mechanised boats (mostly trawlers) issued by 
it t a  rtrnd nt  Re.75 million. Of this Rs. 58 million was the 
c i a 1  t - or Rs.42,000 per boat which on the average 
rbout 30 - 40 per cent of the inve~tment cost. The 
-rianee of the commercial banks in this regard is unlikely to 
h e  been very different . 
& mmrt Committee was appointed by the Government. of Kerala to 
Btuly the question of resource depletion and overf ishing. (See 
hlaw) This Committee was of the unanimous opinion that the 
investment i: Kerala ' s coastal w,. '-ers was far ab:-ve the desirable 
optimal levels. 
Table:4 Estimates of Excess Fishing Craft in Ker~la 
Craft Type Existing# Committee * Excess 
Number Recommendation Number Eercent 
Trawlers 2807 11.45 1662 59 
Purse-seiners 54 Nil 54 100 
Motorised Crafts 6934 2690 4244 61 
Non-motorised 20170 20000 170 n~gligible 
Crafts 
Source: # Department of Fisheries (personal request-Sept 1986- 
Mechanised gill-net boats not accounted here 
* Kalawar, 1985 
From the above calculations it was estimated that the extent of 
overcapitalisation 5.1 the fishery was of the order of Rs.530 
million -- an amount equal to the total development ~ssistance 
given by the state to rhe fisheries sector in Kerala curing the 
three decades of planned development.(Achari,1987b) 
The econorn!.~, eco-system. and biological aspects of overfishine 
were integrally linked. They reinforce a downward spiral which 
could in time lead to the complete collapse of the fishery* 
6 .  IMPACT OF OVERFISHING 
The overfishing of the coastal marine fishery resources of o era la 
has brought ruin primarily to the commoners -- the vast majority 
of working fishermen of Kerala State whose livelihoods are a t  
stake; and the poorer sections of consumers for whom fish forms a 
25 
:rjor source of nutrition and a culturally indispensj-ble part of 
the diet. 
'rductivity and Incomes of Fishermen 
The preductivi ty of the working fishermen dropped significantly 
nththe overfishing. Incomes however did not plunge to abysmal 
;eve18 because shore prices of fish exhibited considerable 
ucreases. They rose from around Rs.l260/tonne in 1974 to 
rhr trends in productivity and income were similar for both the 
3erkers on the mechanised trawlers and the artisanal fishermen 
vrrking with their traditional crafts . 
Yrking 1974 a3 a base we see that productivity a ~ d  income levels 
iecliaed across the board. Trawler crew who harvested 10 tonnes 
of fish in 1974 landed only 7.7 tonnes in 1982. Their real per 
-r)itr incomes during this period fell by 45 percent from around 
! ~ . 2 7 @ 0  to Rs. 1500. In the case of the artisanal fishermen the 
extent of setback was similar. Productivity registered a 50 
percent decline between 1974 and 1982 -- falling f ram 3.3 tonnes 
8 1.6 tonnes. Real per capita incomes also dropped from Rs. 850 
:O Rm.420 during this period. (See Table: 5 1 
Table: 5 Productivity and Income of Fishermen in Kerala 
(Income per capita in 60-61 prices) 
Year Fishermen on Trawlers . Artisanal Fishermen 
Productivity Income Productivity f ncome 
(Tonnes/yr) (Rs) (Tonnes/yr) (Rs 
Source: Kurien & Achari, 1988 
Recent estimates made ~y the state government also indicate that 
the per capica state U O ~ I ~ ~ S L I L :  L)L.UUUC~ iSDP) is increasing faster 
than the per capita fishery sector product (FSP). In 1973-74 when 
the SDP was Rs.811, the FSP was 18 percent lower. By 1980-81 the 
gap increased to nearly 30 percent and quick estimates for 1986- 
87 place the SDP at Rs.2371 and the FSP at Rs, 1415 -- a 
difference of 40 percent. Though the population growth of the 
fishing community is higher than the state average, this 
increasing disparity is primarily due to the slower rate ef 
growth of the fishery sector product. This is due to the change 
in the composition of fish harvests towards species commanding 
lower market values following the overfishing of high value 
species. 
fncene Disparities Between Workers and Owners 
merfirhing has not only reduced the income levels of the the 
arkinq  fishermen it has also increased the level of disparity 
ittween them and the non-worker capitalist owners of mechanised 
~ ~ a t a .  From a small share of 12 percent of the total value of 
rltput ef the sector (1969) their slice of the fish-pie increased 
- 0  27 percent in the boom period of 1974, Thereafter, with the 
~haae ef aver2 ishing setting in, their share increased further. 
r t  rerchod 43 percent by 1982. (See Table: 6 )  
Table: 6 Distribution of Value of Output of Fish between 
Workers and Owners 
(In Rs, Million) 
Workers * Owners of Mechanised Boats 
* Artiranal f i,shermen (worker: and worker-own: ;s and workers 
m on mech;niscC 33ats. . LG,;G, LA ( ) are the shares. 
nwrce: Kurien & Achari, 1988 
;ith the increase in the number of mechanised boats between 1969 
and 2 the number of owners has increased. This partly 
.plain8 the increase in their shares. However, assessments of 
~rmfitability ( mentioned in section above: Govt of India, 1971; 
M7t. of Kerala, 1979; Rurien and Willmann, 1982) indicate that 
-ti1 1980-81 the net returns on investment on mechanised boats 
em thr average were positive and that the private returns were 
lacra tive . 
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Less Fish foj the Masses 
Fish was at one time considered to be the poor man's protein fn 
Kerala. No more. Viewed from the perspective of the avid fi* 
eating population of the state more investments for fisheries 
development have yielded less fish for domestic consumption. The 
availability and quality of fish sold in the markets have 
deteriorated and the retail prices have increased faster than the 
general cost of other food items. (Kurien, 1984). There ig  
evidence to indicate that middle and higher income households are 
shifting to more readily available and cheaper sources ef 
protein. (Nair, 1978). The poorer consumers do not exhibit 8a.y 
changes in diet patterns and are therefore the ones most affected 
by this scarcity of fish. Per capita availability of lo call^ 
consumed fish has decreased from around 19.kilogrammes in 1971-72 
to around 9 kilogrammes in 1981-82. (Kurien,1985) 
7. RESPONSES TO OVERFISHING 
The responses to the overfishing crisis have come from severr 
quarters. We shall here deal with only the responses of the kt 
actors -- the fishermen; the boat owners and exporters; the statr 
and the scientific community. understanding the nature of their 
reactions and the logic behind them is crucial. Any attempt ti 
resolve the crisis will have to necessarily involve all to them. 
lespenscs of' the Fishermen 
There were .two types of responses by the fishermen -- political 
and tcc5~c~loaical. 
The first, beginning in 1970, was more vocal and publicly 
visible. beeline in productivity and drop in incomes began to get 
cerxclated in the minds of the artisanal fishermen as a direct 
result of the destructive. fishing by mecharrised boats. Isolated 
physical conflicts at sea between trawlers, purse-seiners and 
fishermen using traditional craft were on the increase. Soon 
there were strong waves of organised dissent by the artisanal 
fishernen. They demanded that anarchic and destructive fishing by 
traulera snb purse-seiners be stopped. They wanted , a zoning of 
the coastal .waters in what can be considered a plea for state 
regulation of the commons by the creation of distinct fishing 
zones. This would compel the n .  chanised boats zo fish in deeper 
raters. They also demanded a total ban of trawling operations 
during the monsoon months of June, July and August -- the 
breedin? season for many fishes . This socio-ecological movement 
extracted rich dividends f ram the lef t-wing dominated government 
i n  )ewer at that time. Most important was the legal enactments 
praviding for comprehensive measures restricting and regulating 
fish in^ a c t h i t i e s  in c'oastal waters. 161 
Frem 1981 onwards the ides of May brought the onrtet of the 
xnseen in Kerala and along with it tne organised struggles of 
the fishermen. 
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Until 1983 if was an independent trade union ( i  ,e one which had 
no affiliation to any political party -- an anomaly in the 
Kerala context) which spearheaded the fishermen's agitation. In 
1984 all the major political parties in Kerala without exception 
created ( and in a few cases revived) their own fishermen unions 
and joined the fray. The movement developed from strength t* 
strength and reached its zenith that year. The movement ' 8 
slogans and its non-violent agitational tactics brought it int* 
the limelight of the national information media. rt received the 
support of many environmentalists and ecology groups all over the 
country. (For details of this process see Kurien, 1988a 1 
A second type of response -- the technological -- which set off 
in 1981/82, wzis slower, Fishermen -- individually a.nd in groups 
-- were taking on to using outboard engines on their traditional 
crafts- These artefacts were reduce the drudgery of their 
work, provide the flexibity to fish in deeper waters and t h u s  
hopefully catch more fish. What started as a cautious 
experimentation soon acquired the proportions of a tidal wave and 
had the tacit support of the new right-wing government in power. 
(See below) 
The new artefact resulted in a phenomenal reduction in the 
drudgery of fishing. ( Most artisanal fishermen switched over 
from using a combination of oars and sails to a total dependence 
on the outboard engine for  propulsion of their crafts . I  The 
technical possibility to enhance their range of fishing beyond 
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the averfish-d coasta l  waters ale0 fructified. However, for both 
theme desirable conditions to be simultaneously reallsed entailed 
r siginficant rise in operating costs. This fact, combined with 
the unfamiliarity to deeper waters, left only one option open: to 
centinue fishing in the coastal waters for longer periods of time 
and with more fishing gear. Mechanical power provided the 
flrxibility to use more active fishing techniques -- inclu8ing 
srrller versions of trawl nets and purse-seine nets, 
The political upheaval of the fishermen was basically a response 
tm being deprived .of their traditional, historical, communal 
rights over the coastal commons. The state legislations of 1980 
zenimg the coastal waters was an igso f-a-cm recognition of these 
righta. Their subsequent widespread and anarchic expansion of 
investment and fishing effort within this zone was basically a 
ruccunbering to a crisis of sc .rival brought .':,out by declining 
prmductivitp and incomes, Engulfed in the euphoric wave of the 
new technology, they did not stop to think of the long term 
, 
implications of their pursuits. The potential gains from zoning 
the coastal commons was almost totally lost by these actions. 
Reaunses of the Boat Owners and Export Lobby 
@).ring 'the agitation of the fishermen was the economically 
streag, and hence, politically influential boat owners ' 
r~seciationo and export processors lobby. They had strong 
cmnnectione with both the left and the right wing coalition 
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governments. They contested the e~alogical views of the artisan4 
fishermen as being based on myths and argued forcefully thatM 
ban on monsoon trawling would result in a major drop in th 
foreign exchange earnings from prawns- The unemployment 
implications of a three-month trawling ban was also highlighted. 
They argued that this would create an explosive social situation 
in the overall context of high unemployment in Kerala. 
The boat owners' associations also went to court questioning the 
validity of government promulgation$ regulating and restricting 
their free access to the coastal commons. They deemed fishing in 
the commons their fundamental right enshrined in the 1ndian 
Constitution. The High Court ruled in their favour- 1t held t h a  
while the state did have a right to regulate the coastal commons, 
it could take action to exclude persons from it only if 
sufficient scientific evidence was available to substantiate that 
these persons' activities were socially or ecologically harmful 
and against the interests of the majority in society. Such 
unambiguous evidence could not be mustered up by the state. 
This was a victory for the boat owners and the exporters. 
Despite fresh' legislations enacted by respective governments 
making amends for the loopholes in the law, in reality the status 
prevailed: the coastal commons continued to be open to a l l -  
Resvenses of the State 
The state  began to recognise the issue of overfishing only after 
the s ec ia l  ~~pheaval in the coastal areas in the late 1970's 
kcare widespread. Thereafter , irrespective of the political 
celour of the government in power, the conflicts between the 
traditienal fishermen and the trawlers at sea created intense 
pressure on the political system. In a parliamentary democracy 
with a multi-party system and a predominance of coastal electoral 
carstituencies, no political party could take the restive fishing 
cemmunity for granted. 
b left-wing dominated coalition was in power in the state in 
1 They were .in basic sympathy with the movement of the 
artisanal fishermen who were a big vote-bank. However they could 
r(et everlook the economic interests of the boat owners and the 
Pxperters. Sn a . democratic po1,ty f unctioninj in the overall 
capital ist ic  framework of society, the vote-bank strength as well 
d r  the economic clout of the various interest groups involved 
Bust necessarily be carefully baAanced. The left-wing dominated 
?aalitien therefore ( as  mentioned above) enacted legislations to 
a-egulrte and manage the commons. They also postponed taking hard 
i tcisiens,  which would necessarily be biased, by - constituting an 
*%pert committee (see below) composed of scientists working in 
fishery institutions located in the state, government bureaucrats 
ind representatives of fishermen and the boat owners, to examine 
the ecelogical  snd economic aspects of the issues raised. The 
*nu8 af suggesting remedies was also bestowed on the committee. 
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Elections ir 19 82 brought '. more conservv..tive right-wing 
dominated coalition government into power. However, the swing in 
the coastal votes towards the left did not go unnoticed by them. 
They realised the gravity of the situation and its future 
electoral implications. The fact that the Chief Minister himself 
chose to hold the heitherto insignificant fisheries portfolio 
a clear indicator of this, 
When the fishermen announced renewal of their monsoon agitatien 
in 1984, this government was firm about its stand, It wa* 
unwilling to negotiate with the fishermen and tried its best to 
break the agitation using strong arm tactics. ~t also atternptec 
to wean away sections of the fishermen through the influences 
religious leaders. These met with limited success. 
When the "stick approach" faiiad, the "carrdt approach" w.8 
tried. This met with considerable success. The governmen1 
warned against militant unionisation and divided the ranks of thr 
fishermen by placating those under its political influence with 
direct financial assistance -- subsidies and loans -- as well an 
access to intermediate technology. Implicit in this strategy 
the tenet: "if you can't beat the trawlers join them with Y Q ~ J  
outboard engines !" With this the piivate initiative of SeR' 
fishermen on this score ( mentioned above ) got a big boost- 
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huthar, the government concedb to the demane; of the unions to 
anmint  a second committee to re-examine the issues regarding 
8verfishing and destructive fishing , The committee was to 
c r a i s t  only of reputed sc'ientists and the government vouched to 
accept its recommendations, Such a committee was appointed in 
1914 (see below) and was expected to give its recommendations 
within a year. 
Re-res of the Scientific Community 
Nent ef the fishery scientists in their wildest dreams had 
imagined that the question of where and when fishes in Kerala 
laid their eggs and breed would become a hot political issue! 
When it did, they were at a loss on the position they should 
take. Moat of them being government servants, and working in 
highly bureaucratic and hierarchical ins ti tutions had little 
rcrderic fr-s€dom. When ccnfrcnted by the fishermen representa- 
tives who on occasions did point to inconsistencies in scientific 
~ublications, they had little choice but to get defensive. 
In the first expert committee appointed by the government in 
1911, ene of the most reputed fishery scientists in India failed 
t o  participate at meetings on the plea that the fishermen's 
Irrands were "more political than scientific. l1 He thought it best 
t a  leave it to the bureaucrats to resolve the diametrically 
@??@#in# positions of the fishermen and the trawler owners on the 
fishtry-ecological issues. This committee , not surprisingly, 
Ceuld rat arrive at any consensus. 
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The seco~ld kxpert commiLte= &yy~inted in 1984 consisted of only 
three fishery experts -- one experienced fishery administrater 
and two leading fishery scientists. It was significant that the 
trio were from outside Kerala State. Though never stated 
explicitly, this was to ensure that the socio-economic and 
political forces at work in the fish economy of Kerala State 
would not bias their working. 
They travelled along the length of Kerala's coastline and met 
with all the sections and groups which had a stake in the fish 
economy. The committee submitted its findings in 1985. 
It cautioned the government about the impending crisis which 
could affect the coastal waters if the existing tor-figuration ef 
fishing assvts and fishing c..'?ort continue.' tc grow in an 
unregulated fashion. They did not approve the need for a monsoon 
trawling ban but favoured a drastic reduction of the fleet size 
of the trawlers to half the then current level. They recommended 
the use of more passive fishing techniques of the type used by 
artisanal fishermen; were in strong favour of a total ban on 
purse-seiners; cautioned the government and the artisanal 
fishermen about the massive motorisation drive; and highlighted 
the need for active fishermen's participation in managing the 
coastal commons. 
8. RESOLVINC 3VERFISHING 
I t  would be a truism to state that the fish economy of Kerala is 
in the throes of a crisis. From our above analysis it is also 
clear that, in the long run, it is the coastal commons the 
inrking fishermen rather than the capitalists that have been most 
affected. 
The primary reason for this is that the capitalists can easily 
neveout of the fishery while the fishernen are more or less tied 
ta  it owing to a lack of alternative economic opportunities. For 
the fishermen, their future lies in the sea and its common 
reseurces. For capitalists, given their- short-term perspective 
md under the given conditions of investment, the ratio of 
?refits from indiscriminate harvesting of the commons to the 
prmfits from regulated and susta: .,able harve~tir.~ are large. For 
them i t  actually pays to bring ruin to the commons! 
It is such conflicting motivations and actions which provide the 
bas i s  for the unequal bargaining power of the two classes and the 
rationale for the state to regulate the coastal marine waters. 
An a c t i o n  plan to resolve it is indeed the priority of the day. 
The objective of any programme of action must be two-fold: (a) to 
revive the sustainability of the coastal commons and (b) ensure 
that it provides a basis for a decent livelihood and inexpensive 
feed for as large a population as is p~ssible. To ensure the 
achievement of these objectives deman3s a policy approach in 
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which develo~ment and managemen, of the marine .ssourczs and the 
fish economy are seen as two-sides of tke same coin. 
The scale and type of harvesting technology should be in 
consonance with the known biological and ecological parameters of 
the resource. Small-scale of fishing crafts using multiple 
sources of energy, selective fishing 5ear, and operations from 
decentralised centres along the total length of the coastline 
should be encouraged. Economically efficient but e.:ologicallY 
destructive fishing artefacts should be strictly controiled 
irrespective of the user. 
The ownership of harvesting techl~ology -- fishing craft and gear 
-- should be, restricted exclusively tc those who are willing t@ 
fish. An aquarian reform of sorts to ensure this needs to ID@ 
enacted b-7 tb.,.s state. FvrlF. ? , ?rra~!rtttt of woikers and workins- 
owners should be entrusted with the collective rights an( 
responsibility of managing the coastal commons within the 
jurisdiction of their decentralized operations at the micro 
mezzo levels. 
Conscious efforts to enhance the biological productivity of the 
coastal waters should be given adequate encouragement. Attempts 
such as the collective creation and establishment of f i r b  
z~gregration devices in coastal wsters are good examples oC th i s .  
Hr7irq t e  the heitherto unfished deeper waters is an essential 
rtrp to reduce the pressure on cne coastal commons. This is an 
arena for diverting some of the ejtcess investments presently in 
the  ceattal waters. Making fresh investments in the deep sea 
r ? . ~ ~ l d  be preceeded by thorough resource estimation surveys and 
ecwemic viability studies . These need not be excessively 
preeccupied with export potentials. Subsidies to those who move 
eut  t e  these waters may be more economically and socially 
jwtif iable. 
Tkr above options with regard to conserving and enhancina the 
fi3bry resource; the choice, ownership and operation of the 
technology; as well as the social institutions for managemest of 
the resource provide the basic framework for a fresh policy 
ap~roach. This will be required to gull Kerala's fish economy out 
e:' its ecological crisis and pro.... 'de a sustains! .'.e future for the 
fishery resources in the coastal commons and the commoners --the 
fishwarkers as well as the poorer consumers 
POSTSCRIPT 
Fish production continued to drop in Kerala after 1985. Thl 
political and technological responses of the fishermen cantinuel 
unabated. The state played to both the tunes. 
In 1988, responding to the continued demands of the fishermen'fi 
unions for a monsoon ban on the operation of trawling boats, th4 
government, dominated by left parties,promulgated a partial banr 
All the trawler operating centres in the state -- except t h 4  
largest one, Neendakara -- were ordered closed for the months ed 
July and August. The reason given for not closing Neendakara wr(l 
that the heavy concentration of a marine prawn (P. Styliferal i a  
the inshore area during thp-e months wou?.d perish if nal 
harvested (mainly by the trawlers) resulting in loss of foreid 
exchange and employment. 
The partial ban turned out to be ineffective. It could'nob 
prevent trawlers from the other.,centres operating from out 04 
I 
Neendakara. The boat owners also went to court charging thr 
government of discriminatory 'treatment of trawlers located i# 
different parts of the state. The traditional fishermen's unimnd 
were also unhappy with the situation. There, seemed to be n{ 
significant political,economic or ecological gains from thi4 
management measure. 
By 1 8  the motorisation uave had swept through every .fishing 
village in the state. power propulsion of traditional fishing 
craft was here to stay. 
Noterimation of traditional crafts did result in fishing in 
deeper waters leading to an increase in physical productivity and 
harvesting of new species. This was however at a much higher 
investment and recurring cost . In the central and northern 
reji*ns of the stater- motorisation gave a big boost to the use of 
fine merhed encircling nets called 'ring seines' used to harvest 
pelagic shoaling species. These were nothing but a smaller 
version of' the larger destructive purse-seine nets. This trend 
created new ,tensions within traditional fishermen groups in these 
areas. 
@it@ eblivious of the economic, social or ecological implications 
ef the above, the government actively promoted the earlier 
subsidy scheme for the purchase of outboard motors and introduced 
a new one .for ring-seines. 
rhe continued conflict between fishermen using traditional 
fishing crafts and those using trawlers as well as the emerging 
cmflicts between traditional fishermen themselves (over the use 
@f nets like ring seines), prompted the government to seriously 
re-examine . the overall crisis in the fish economy. The 
qavernnent had before it the recommendations of two earlier 
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Expert Committees ( mentioned above). Most of these had not been 
fully implemented. It however deemed it necessary to constitute 
a third Expert Committee to review the situation once again in 
the light of the recommendations of the earlier Committees. The 
main terms of reference of this Committee included: a re- 
examination of the question of the monsoon trawling ban; an 
appraisal of the unprecedented increase in the nukber of outboard 
engines and their power rating; and also a review of the 
C010gical and social impact of the rapid iAcrease in the use Of 
gear like ring seines by the traditional fishermen. 
This Expert Committee submitted its report to the government on 
26 June 1989. The government decided to immediately implement one 
of the recommendations made by the Committee: a total manseen 
trawling ban. The other recommendations which included 
restrictiocs on the use of ring seines; limitations on HP rating 
of outboard engines; and measures for protection of estuarine 
areas, were kept in abeyance. 
The enforcement of the total trawl ban -- an effective measure te 
regulate access to the coastal commons -- resulted in bloody 
confrontations between the enforcement police and the boat owners 
at the major trawler landing centre, Neendakara. The boat owners 
took the matter to the High Court and the Supreme Court. B o t h  
courts were unwilling to issue a stay order to the government's 
decision. This legal ruling and the unwavering stand of t h e  
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prrr~rne-t, 82sgite : ; ;., ziZlc adverse politi&al fallout, 
mrured that the ban was fully effective. 
b e  ban did result in a considerable loss of employment for the 
mrk8rs in the grocessina industry. A fair number of the 
Fishermen from the traditional tishing communities who worked as 
t e w a n  the trawlers found opportunities to go fishing on the 
lbtorised boats operated from their home villages. A large number 
pert however unemployed. The loss of current foreign exchange 
urnings has not been assessee. 
h e  total monsoon trawl ban was ths most important fishery 
Unagernent decision made by any goverqment in the country since 
Independence. The government also consitiuted an 
Snterdi8cip:inary task force tn assess the t n t a l  impact of the 
ban. 
Two months after the ban was lifted (October 1989) very large 
pelagic fish harvests were reported fro;n all over the state. 
It would be wrong to atcribuce this phenomenon entirely to the 
trawling ban though both the ruling party politicians and the 
traditional fishermen ' s unions have dona so. 
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Much of the credit should go co che yet-to-be-well-understead 
nature-induded changes in the sea -- a.g the effect of enhance4 
rains and known cyclic fluctuations of pelagic stocks. 
However the total ban of trawling probably did contributr 
significantly to this phenomenon. The non-disturbance of the 
aquatic milieu. during the monsoon months could be an important 
cause for the more pronounced shoreward movement of the pelagic 
fish shoals in pursuit of food which 5s found in abundance in t h e  
inshore water areas cooled by the inflow by rivers swollen by. 
the heavy monsoon rains. 
The ability of the motorised units -- partiei~larly those usin.  
ring-seines -- to harvest whole pelagic shoals also provide an 
important reason. for the incre~sed harvest ai*~on the favourable 
nature-induced conditions and the after effect of the trawl ban' 
mentioned above. 
Shore prices and retail market prices dropped drastically. 
Reminiscent of the 1950ms, fresh fish was sold as manure for 
coconut plantations ! It is unlikely that this bumper harvest 
has had a commensurate positive effect on incomes of fishermen. 
However it certainly provided a temporary boost to th+ 
nutritional status of fish consumers -- particularly the poorer 
among them. 
This increased harvest {the quantative details of which will be 
available only by early 1990) therefore seems t o  have been 
brought about by a strange combination of factors : largely 
mpredictable nature-induced processes, strong political will 
ba l ing  to firm management measures and the use of ecological 
*ver-eff icient harvescing technology. 
@?1y a medium-term ex-post analysis will unravel which of these 
fictmrs was the determining one. 
NO' S 
1. This famous article of Hardin (1968) talks about the way a 
herdsmar, - ., -2 " - --. ,,J to keep as rnany cattle as possible on the 
common pastures, Every "rational herdsman" is expected to behave 
in the same manner since he "is locked into a system thit compels 
him to increase his herd without; limit -- in a worlo that is 
limited ..... Freedom in the commons brings ruin 'to all." 
Dasgupta (1968) analysing the key passage in Hardin9s.article 
( from vrhich t k e  above quote is taken) comments that it would be 
difficult to locate another passage of comparable length and fame 
containing as rnaly errors as the one above. There are assumptions 
which Hardin makes hiniself which by an act of transference he 
foists on the poor unprotesting herdsman. For example animals are 
not costle3s and such private costs set limits on the number of 
animals each herdsman finds most profitable to introduce into the 
common pasture. Whether or not the common will be ruiced depends 
on a number of factors, one of which is the price of the output 
(milk or bee21 relative to the private cost of rearing cattle. 
That the 3asture is a comrr-ons is not a sufficient condition te 
lead to its r~in. 
2. In tropical nulti-specie fisheries, biological overfishing may 
occur e T ~ c n  t b ~ u g h  total catch is sti3.1 increasing because the 
decline i? yield -- or complete extinction -- of one or several 
specie may be compensated through higher yields of other species. 
3. Biologis ta further distinguish between "growth overfishing" , 
"recruitmer,t nierfishing" and "e-osysten overf+shingW dependiv 
on which ?:. ::?- most iaportent f+ctor nreventin~ full recovery dr 
growth of the stock. (Pauly, 1979) 
4. The nn::L::-:a sustainable yield (MSY) is subject to changes due 
to bioAogica1 and ecological factors. Hence, MSY estimated for r 
year need not be the same for all years. The estimates quoted in 
the article are taken from George et al, 1977 and are the only 
available and comprehensive estimates made so far. 
5. Output figures in this and other parts of the paper (unless 
otherwise r.sctioned) are taken from the published data of the 
Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute, Price data is taker 
from the Asministrative Reports of the Department of Fisheries. 
6. The Kerala Marine Fishing Regulation Act (1980) provided f e ~  
the comprober;sive measures for registration of all fishing craft, 
It also restricted the fishing by mechanised boats -- in 
particular the trawlers and the purse-seiners -- to a depth 
outside the 20 fathom depth contour line in the coastal sea. The 
zone on the shore-side of this contour was reserved exclusivel? 
for the non-a~torised and motorised craft. 
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